Many were optimistic that an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was imminent following the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran. Others pinned their hopes on Washington-led negotiations to secure a partial withdrawal – one that would save face for the Lebanese authorities and provide them with leverage against their domestic adversaries. However, the reality on the ground defies these hopes, pointing instead to an unyielding Israeli determination to remain within Lebanese territory. Understanding the repercussions of a withdrawal from Lebanon clarifies the reasons behind Israel’s intransigence and the impossibility of making the decision to withdraw.
A New Doctrine Superseding the Old
The shift in Israel’s security doctrine cannot be treated as a mere detail in the analysis of regional data and events. Following the failure of the previous security doctrine – predicated on superiority and deterrence – to prevent the events of October 7 and their aftermath, it became essential to introduce a new, viable, and measurable model. This model aims to restore – at least partially – Israeli confidence in the security establishment and its capacity for protection. Thus emerged the concept of security belts and buffer zones: a strategy designed to restore public confidence while simultaneously bolstering the political agenda of the Israeli government and its coalition, capitalizing on favorable circumstances that might not recur.
This doctrine emerged as a replacement for one that had demonstrably failed to ensure security; a withdrawal from Lebanon – under any pretext – would effectively dismantle this new doctrine, thereby striking a fundamental blow to the very concept of Israeli security. No one in a position of authority in Israel can make a decision that jeopardizes the state’s existence – by compromising its security – without first presenting an alternative security doctrine. Such a doctrine would be essential to convince the Israeli public that security and wartime gains could be maintained despite a withdrawal from Lebanon; yet, such a doctrine appears beyond the reach of anyone in Israel.
Withdrawal Begets Further Withdrawals
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the decision to withdraw from the security zone in Lebanon is its impact on the security situation in other areas under Israeli control. The withdrawal sends a message to the Syrian people: expelling Iran from Syria, severing Hezbollah’s supply lines, engaging in high-level direct negotiations with Israel, setting aside the Golan issue, and adhering to Israeli restrictions across southern Syria will not compel Israel to withdraw from Mount Hermon or the territories it occupied following the fall of the previous regime. Instead, Israel will continue to impose its security control over southern Syria whenever and wherever it chooses. Conversely, if you stand firm and fight, you will liberate your land and regain your sovereignty. This notion – taking root in the Syrian collective consciousness – could lead to the emergence of new groups, or the revival of old ones, seeking to translate this idea into reality, even if only in the long run.
The same message will reach Gaza, making it clear that there is no way out of the current reality through the so-called “Board of Peace”, mediation efforts, or unilateral adherence to agreements; rather, the only path lies in emulating the Lebanese model – which endured similar circumstances for 15 months following the 2024 war. Perhaps the most critical message is the one destined for the people of the West Bank – the heart of the Israeli government’s agenda. That government has effectively begun annexing the remaining Palestinian territories and delivered the *coup de grâce* to the Oslo Accords, which had already been clinically dead for years. If Israel were to withdraw from Lebanon under pressure from Iran, it might embolden groups in the West Bank to seek a change in the status quo; they have nothing left to lose, given that their Authority’s concessions failed to yield any gains, while the path of confrontation proved effective – despite the heavy price paid.
Based on the foregoing, a decision to withdraw threatens not merely the fate of a government, party, or coalition in Israel, but Israel’s very existence and future. Consequently, no one in Israel – regardless of their opposition to Netanyahu – possesses the capacity to make such a decision. Yet, this does not mean a withdrawal from Lebanon is impossible; the impossibility lies in the “Israeli” ability to make the decision to withdraw, not in the withdrawal itself. Iran fully grasps this reality, understanding that the decision must originate from the only party capable of imposing it upon Israel: the United States. Such a move would only occur if American security were jeopardized. Here, the Strait of Hormuz emerges as a strategic card in Iran’s hands, allowing it to control international energy and maritime security – thereby posing a direct threat to American security interests.
Hassan Alaa Eddine is an independent Lebanese writer focusing on geopolitics and strategic analysis. He is currently a PhD candidate in the field of engineering in Toulouse, France. He writes on Substack. His email is hassanalaaeddine97@gmail.com.
